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Soon after Munich 'Popular Front' candidates did well at the Oxford and Bridgwater by-elections, which seemed to give the project new impetus. 8 Cripps's memorandum in January 1939 to the Labour Party's National Executive Committee (NEC) argued that the party would not be able to defeat the National Government at the next election unless it placed itself at the head of an electoral alliance of 'all opposition parties'. 9 The NEC rejected the idea. Undeterred, Cripps embarked on a national campaign in order to rally support and convince the NEC to change its mind. The party expelled him for this action.
Attitudes within the north-east labour movement were particularly important as Cripps launched his campaign to collect the signatures of Popular Front supporters at a public meeting in Newcastle on Sunday, 5 February 1939. Fortune played its part in this decision as Cripps requisitioned a pre-arranged Tribune (a Cripps-controlled periodical) rally in the town. However, Newcastle was in many regards an appropriate place to launch such a campaign. 10 It was the main city of a region characterized by a traditionally moderate and loyal labour movement that dominated in many localities. This was especially true of the coal producing areas of County Durham. There, Labour enjoyed hegemonic support amongst the working class. The higher turnout, collapse of the Liberal vote and middle classes voting Conservative, rather than a loss THE NORTH-EAST AND THE POPULAR FRONT, 1938-39 of working class support, explained Labour's loss of five Durham mining seats in the 1931 general election debacle. 11 The Durham Miner's Association (DMA), usually regarded as a moderate section of the Miners' Federation, effectively was the Labour Party in the coalfield.
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The North-East was precisely the kind of region that Cripps would need to win over if he was to have any success in changing labour movement policy. This article will examine in detail Cripps's Petition campaign in the North-East; the attitudes and actions of its supporters and opponents, its effects, successes and failures and their causes and consequences, comparing these with the less well documented 1938 United Peace Alliance campaign. 13 Consideration of these two Popular Front campaigns at grassroots level is itself of utility.
14 However, more importantly, the failure of the Popular Front campaigns in the North-East throws light on the political culture of the region; on the attitudes within parties and relations between political party activists at grassroots level during a tumultuous moment in twentieth-century British history.
Cripps's friends and enemies in the North
Tribune deemed the inaugural 'Petition Campaign' meeting in Newcastle an 'amazing experience' that had seen 'as good a launching as ever had any ship'. 15 12 Beynon and Austrin wrote that the Labour Party was 'very much established as the political arm of the trade union'. They regarded County Durham as the 'classic case' of the dominance of a moderate labour tradition; 'the centre of moderation and respectable Labour politics in Britain' where 'officialdom has reigned supreme within the working class'. Robert Moore claimed Methodism and nonconformism were largely responsible for the character of the DMA's trade unionism. Methodism emphasized thrift and accepted ownership of private property. Nonconformist beliefs were based on an acceptance of the market system: they encouraged deference to coal owners and placed faith in arbitration and conciliation rather than confrontation. This first problem for Cripps was that, although some were well known, all of these individuals were on the left of the Labour Party and therefore predictable Popular Front supporters. Trevelyan and Blenkinsop had supported the Popular Front 'United Peace Alliance' campaign in 1938. 19 Though there is no evidence of Lawther or Watson supporting the United Peace Alliance they were both on the Labour left and had actively supported the united front. 20 Oxford-educated Wilkes had only been Labour parliamentary candidate for Newcastle Central since January 1938 and was, at twenty-two, possibly the youngest prospective parliamentary candidate in England. 21 It is likely that Wilkes did not openly support the United Peace Alliance because he did not wish to jeopardize his standing within the Labour Party at such an early stage in his career. 22 These observations largely applied to other high-profile petition campaign supporters. County Councillor John Bell, who agitated for Cripps within Bishop Auckland constituency Labour Party, was a long-standing friend of Trevelyan who shared his views on the deteriorating international scene. 23 Blaydon left-wingers Henry Bolton, Steve Lawther and wife Emmie all acted in various ways to marshal support for Cripps.
THE NORTH-EAST AND THE POPULAR FRONT, 1938-39 The second problem for Cripps was that the support provided by some of these key individuals was questionable. Will Lawther's attitude, for example, was distinctly lukewarm. He agreed to stop supporting Cripps when the NEC threatened him with expulsion from the Labour Party. 25 Support from Blenkinsop and Wilkes was important, but both of these were young men. The young are expected to be rebellious and can be afforded indulgences. The NEC did expel the veteran aristocrat Trevelyan for his actions. Though clearly dedicated, Trevelyan's flaw was ignorance of his own constituency Labour Party's attitude to the issue. He admitted having 'no conception what they are thinking in the rank-and-file' immediately before attending the Wansbeck constituency party meeting on the controversy. 26 This became evident when his pro-Cripps resolution was easily defeated at the constituency party's annual meeting, despite Trevelyan's own high standing in the party. 27 Others, though pro-Popular Front, did not support Cripps's campaign at all. Willard Sexton (Hexham Labour parliamentary candidate) refused to sign a letter protesting at NEC threats to Popular Front supporters within the party. Sexton was 'still in favour of a Popular Front, but in my view it has been apparent for some time that there was not the slightest chance of carrying it at the Labour Party conference'.
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Ellen Wilkinson, MP for Jarrow, argued for Cripps's plan on the Labour NEC, but she did not sign the petition and was not prepared to risk expulsion. 29 The third major problem for Cripps was that most of the individuals who provided unstinting support represented no one other than themselves. Trevelyan got his local 25 Lawther, along with C. L. Poole MP, provided a satisfactory reply to a letter from the NEC regarding support for Cripps's campaign that had been sent to seven important Labour Party members (also including Bevan and Trevelyan). Cooke claimed that of those who withdrew their support from Cripps in February Lawther was 'the most significant'. (Watson seems not to have been named in the letter), but he also pointed out that the vote to suspend standing orders and allow Cripps to speak at the 1939 Labour conference was 'due principally' to Lawther and the miners. Labour Party to submit a resolution condemning Cripps's expulsion from the Labour Party for 'advocating a strategy which at least to a very large section of the party members seems to be the wisest' to a meeting of Wansbeck constituency Labour Party. However, the constituency party itself rejected the resolution by 111 against to only thirty-seven for. 33 It continued to oppose the Popular Front even after Trevelyan's expulsion from the Labour Party over the issue. 34 Likewise, Lawther and Watson received no official DMA support. The other DMA officials either remained silent on the issue or supported the NEC, and there was no lodge vote on either Cripps or the Popular Front.
35 A large majority of Newcastle City Labour Party endorsed Cripps's expulsion and Blenkinsop's constituency Labour Party, Newcastle East, followed suit at its annual meeting, with only four delegates defiant. 36 Indeed, Bishop Auckland constituency Labour Party was so hostile to Cripps supporters in its ranks that it expelled Bell and M. Walton, a second Cripps supporter. 37 Of the first petition signatories, only Wilkes received backing from his constituency Labour Party, Newcastle Central, which also sent two messages of support for Cripps in February. 38 This was particularly significant as Newcastle Central was the only constituency Labour Party in the North-East to support Cripps unequivocally. 33 Each parliamentary constituency had a Constituency Labour Party with a membership that could be active in all or some of three distinct levels of organization within the constituency: in ward Labour Parties (the lowest level), in local or town Labour Party branches (an intermediary level; 'town' here is used to distinguish between constituency and local Labour parties that have the same name, e.g. Jarrow, Gateshead, or South Shields) or at constituency level itself. Constituency Labour Parties were in turn organized into regional federations. There were two of these in the North-East, Northumberland However, Cripps's campaign did draw organizational support from some smaller sections of the north-east labour movement. 39 The degree of success that their support for the Popular Front represented can be ranked into three levels. The first level is of parties and union organizations (normally branches) that were left-wing dominated and therefore predictable Popular Front supporters. Their support thus represented the least significant successes. Stanley local party, in which Bart Kelly, a United Peace Alliance supporter, played a leading role, can be ranked at this level. Other parties at this level were Blaydon (Steve Lawther and Henry Bolton's party), Jarrow and South Shields (all town rather than constituency Labour Parties). They all supported the United Peace Alliance in 1938, in areas where Labour was strong. In Newcastle Central constituency Labour was weaker, but in the thrall of young left-winger Wilkes. On the industrial side, the five DMA lodges openly supporting Cripps had all been involved in left-wing causes such as the Hunger March, supporting Communist affiliation to Labour or the united front 'Unity Campaign'. Newcastle trades council was also involved in all left-wing activity in this period.
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The second level comprises organizations that were not notably left-wing from areas where Labour was weak, such as in parts of Northumberland. Tynemouth Labour Party's support for Cripps was important as relations with the local Communist Party had been poor and the party had not previously supported the Popular Front. 41 The same went for Morpeth Labour Party's support for the petition campaign. In 1936, Morpeth constituency Labour Party voted against supporting Communist Party affiliation to Labour (albeit narrowly). 42 Both Morpeth and Tynemouth parties operated in strongly Conservative areas, so they potentially stood to gain directly from a progressive alliance. However, their support for the Popular Front was less predictable than that of the left-dominated parties discussed above and therefore more of a success when it came.
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A third group of parties that neither of the previous two conditions applied to represented the most significant gains for Cripps. The main example of this group was Blyth Labour Party, where Labour was dominant in local politics and not notably left-wing. Indeed, relations between the Communist Party and the Labour Party in Blyth were strained well before 1939, with open clashes between members of the two parties over the 1936 Hunger March and the day-to-day unemployed campaigns.
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A second example came in a section of Wansbeck constituency Labour Party. In February 1937 a meeting of Newburn local Labour Party narrowly defeated a resolution critical of the NEC's attack on the Socialist League, a left-wing ginger group, and against 'heresy hunting' within the party. 45 In 1939 Newburn local Labour Party supported Cripps. However, as these are the only two examples that can be cited with certainty, this is a reflection of the lack of success Cripps's campaign achieved in the region. Overall, Cripps secured support from most of the regional left-wing plus a handful of other parties. It was nowhere near the level of support required even to challenge the power of the union block votes at Labour's party conference.
An important qualification here is that it is not always clear from the evidence that these organizations actually supported the Popular Front. A message of support for Cripps or condemnation of the NEC did not necessarily indicate agreement with Cripps's memorandum. For example, South Shields Labour MP Chuter Ede's support for Cripps extended only as far as defending him from his treatment by the NEC, rather than actually endorsing his proposals. There is no evidence that Ede had changed his mind on the Popular Front since negative comments he made on an Ellen Wilkinson Popular Front memorandum in late 1938. 46 More constituency Labour Parties expressed their opposition to the NEC's treatment of Cripps than support for his plans. With many of the north-east organizations discussed above, it is impossible to determine whether they supported Cripps's case for a Popular Front or were merely supporting his right to argue his case against an anti-democratic and 41 That Tynemouth trades council did not support Cripps was perhaps due to the chairholder, Ovington's, opposition to Communism. oppressive NEC. Given the relative tolerance of the north-east labour movement, it is very likely that many organizations mentioned above fell into this latter category. Moreover, set against these successes were the organizations that would have been expected to support Cripps, but which did not. Whilst important individuals in Blaydon Labour Party supported Cripps's campaign, it is unlikely Blaydon constituency Labour Party as a whole did, which was significant as it had supported the United Peace Alliance in 1938. 47 South Shields constituency Labour Party also did not support Cripps and neither did Jarrow constituency Labour Party, despite significant sections of both parties backing him. 48 The campaign's most important failures were Newcastle North and Newcastle East constituency Labour Parties. Both had supported the United Peace Alliance in 1938, but in 1939 they openly opposed Cripps. Gateshead town Labour Party, which had supported the united front Unity Campaign in 1937, but not the Popular Front in 1938, was very quiet on the issue. Contrary to Ferguson's claim, it was not clearly 'in favour of the idea of a Popular Front'. 49 Another damaging measure of the non-support for Cripps is evident in those who were billed to speak at the 'Tribune Rally' in Newcastle on 5 February, but who then pulled out when Cripps changed the meeting's remit. The main example was Ellen Wilkinson, but other billed speakers who withdrew included David Adams (Labour MP for Consett), Jack Bowman (an Engineering Union regional official), William Maclean (Wansbeck Labour Party parliamentary candidate) and R. E. Butchart (of the Shop Assistants' Union). 50 Before the meeting, Tribune boasted that 'Practically the whole of the local labour movement will thus be represented at this great meeting'. 51 In the event, much of the local labour movement was, in fact, not represented. Support from David Adams would have been a notable coup, had it been forthcoming. The only Catholic Labour MP in the region, Adams nevertheless openly supported the Spanish Republican cause. 52 Yet he and these other key individuals had shown their opposition to the Popular Front by pulling out of the pre-planned Tribune meeting.
Still, the 5 February launch meeting attracted an impressive audience of 3500 with 1000 turned away. 53 Flushed with success, Trevelyan claimed that the meeting had 47 There is no evidence of the attitude of the Labour MP for the constituency, William Whitely. Perhaps he was just keeping a low profile. Trevelyan was exaggerating: the first Unity Campaign meeting in Newcastle only two years earlier had mobilized 5000 people and raised only £8 less. 55 Furthermore, the Unity Campaign initiated in the region by this earlier equally substantial meeting had no palpable positive effects. Eatwell was thus rightly critical of Cripps's overestimation of the political impact of mass meetings. 56 Moreover, as the meeting had been planned before the Cripps controversy had erupted, it is likely that, like the speakers who were originally billed but did not speak, many in the audience did not support the Popular Front.
Similar observations regarding the size of public meetings not necessarily equating to support are also applicable to a Cripps meeting at Bishop Auckland in late March 1939. With an attendance of 600, it was the largest meeting the town had seen for years. Yet, just over a sixth (110) signed the petition, which was, curiously, even fewer than the 115 who had volunteered to help collect signatures. 57 Cripps meetings at North Shields (with an audience of 350) and West Stanley (600) were also impressive in terms of size. Yet a public meeting featuring a politician as well-known as Cripps was always likely to attract large audiences in places that were normally overlooked by national political figures, out of curiosity if nothing else. 58 The poor response to a conference organized to marshal regional support for the Petition campaign in Gateshead in mid-March 1939 was symbolic of its failure. There were only 160 people representing fifty political parties, trade union branches, miners' lodges and co-operative bodies present at the conference. This was less than 4 per cent of the 1400 organizations that had been invited. 59 The support of around fifty 'progressive organizations' in the whole of the North-East was hardly a ringing endorsement for the Popular Front in 1939. In fact, this Petition conference was around half the size of a United Peace Alliance conference held in the region ten months earlier and even this could not be regarded as well supported. In fact, the way in which a large amount of the money was raised suggests that Cripps benefited from a handful of relatively wealthy benefactors rather than from the pennies of working-class supporters. Trevelyan was the first to donate, and placed £10 on the chairman's table. Members of the audience in the front rows and those on the platform then threw several £5 notes onto the table and an 'avalanche of half crowns' followed. In fact, more than two-thirds of the total donated (£64 9s. 6d. of the £91) was raised in this way before the collecting tin was passed around the audience. Trevelyan's single donation amounted to more than the difference in money raised between this and the Unity Campaign meetings; even then the total collected was not massive. The north-east International Brigade memorial meeting, which occurred two weeks before, raised £142 13s. 6d. Trevelyan was not noted as having attended the first Unity Campaign demonstration, so he may have been ignorant of the turnout and the amount raised. He was, however, at the International Brigade meeting and must have known that it raised over £50 more. In terms of the level of agitation, too, the north-east Petition campaign was unsuccessful. The Gateshead Town Hall conference in mid-March was the only regional level meeting held to organize practical campaigning. 61 In fact, most of the debates occurred in specially called meetings of 'official' labour movement organizations held to discuss the issue. 62 The The final measure of failure was that even in the few localities where Petition campaign machinery appeared to be working and gaining a degree of popular local support, it was incapable of exerting any influence on the power-brokers in the local labour movement. This influence was imperative if the policy was to emerge victorious at the national Labour Party annual conference. At Bishop Auckland, the 115 recruited as campaign supporters managed to collect nearly 1,000 signatures for the Petition within two weeks, and more were still coming in. Yet this impressive figure had no obvious effect on the district labour movement. Indeed, Bishop Auckland constituency Labour Party expelled two of its members for supporting Cripps, and the locality's Petition campaign subsequently disintegrated. A thousand plus signatures meant nothing to labour movement officials in the area. 70 
Reasons for failure: the labour movement
Unlike the United Peace Alliance campaign of the previous year, Cripps's campaign had a definite organizing centre and a figurehead. 71 It also sparked more controversy in the North-East than did the United Peace Alliance, but it was still defeated with an almost 10-1 vote against at the Labour national annual conference in late May 1939. Cole thought that Cripps weakened the Popular Front's case as he argued for it solely on the terms of the Labour leadership, depicting it as an electoral strategy rather than as a device for immediately mobilizing public opinion against government foreign policy. This allowed the NEC to retort that Cripps was 'surrendering socialism'. Moreover, Labour accused Cripps in 1939 'not without justice, of having radically changed his line', a point later echoed by Ralph Miliband. 74 Cripps's opposition to rearmament also caused problems. He had no answer to those who wondered what would be used to back up the anti-appeasement foreign policy of a Popular Front government. 75 Chris Bryant highlighted the confusion in Cripps's own mind over exactly who was to be included in a Popular Front.
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Eatwell also criticized Cripps's tactics, citing his refusal both to consult some leftwingers before embarking on the campaign (such as Ellen Wilkinson) and to listen to those he did consult (such as Shinwell attacking it was also wrong-headed. Cripps played into the hands of the Labour leadership as he focused the campaign on himself. This allowed his opponents to depict him as another Mosley with ease. 77 Bryant seemed unsure of the efficacy of Cripps's tactics. He approved of Cripps sending his memorandum to constituency Labour Parties as he 'stole a march' on the NEC, but this was ineffective as, in doing this, Cripps alienated the NEC. In fact, this action gave the NEC an excuse to punish him 'not for what he said, but for how he had gone about saying it'. 78 Most agree that Cripps's speech at Labour conference, in which he concentrated on why he should have been allowed to behave as he had, rather than arguing the case for the Popular Front, was another tactical error. 79 The tactic of collecting signatures was also flawed. It required a lot of work and was ineffective. As noted above, even large numbers of signatures collected appeared to have no positive impact. 80 On top of this was Cripps's insensitivity. Mervyn Jones has described a line from Cripps's account of his ten week holiday in Jamaica in Tribune as 'perhaps the most tactless sentence ever to appear in a left-wing paper'.
81 Raymond Challinor has also criticized Cripps's personal conduct.
82 Those opposing Cripps in the North-East certainly employed many of these arguments, especially the claim that Cripps's wealth allowed him to pursue a campaign that most in the party would not be able to afford.
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In addition to these problems were the weaknesses in Cripps's organization. Eatwell has argued that Cripps's petition organization was under-funded, badly organized and inefficient. Whilst there were 321 local Petition Committees by the end of April 1939 and 450 in two-thirds of all constituencies in Britain by mid-May, many of these were nominal and a third were concentrated in London. 84 These organizational weaknesses were reflected in the North-East. Though the number of Petition Committees in the region is uncertain, evidence exists for at least four, in Bishop Auckland, Newcastle, Durham and South Shields. It is conceivable that these were the only four in the region: there were only seven in the whole of South Wales, a region that, owing to the relative domination of the Communist Party, provided far more support for the Popular Front than the North-East. 85 Yet, as has been seen, Cripps's organization seems to have functioned relatively well in Bishop Auckland. However, it would be wrong to attribute too much importance to these particular factors. By laying the blame for failure of the Popular Front in 1939 at Cripps's feet, the implication is that the project could have been successful, had it not been for Cripps. This was not the case. The failure of Cripps's campaign in the North-East can be attributed to the same wider factors that ensured that the United Peace Alliance did not receive significant north-east labour movement support in 1938. Indeed, Cripps failed even to mobilize the support that the United Peace Alliance managed in May 1938. This, arguably, may have had something to do with Cripps's particular programme and a way of behaving which alienated some in the region. This is unlikely, however, as Cripps was popular enough for the DMA to vote him as a speaker at its gala in 1939. The timing of Cripps's campaign was crucial. Previously supportive, the Co-operative Party and Liberals were either opposed to the Popular Front or lukewarm by spring 1939. There was also a rift between Liberals and Labour over conscription in early 1939, with Labour opposed and the Liberals in favour. In addition, Eatwell has claimed that a decrease in public interest in foreign affairs in spring 1939 meant that the Petition campaign came too late to capitalize on the aftermath of Munich. The anger felt by some at the Munich 'betrayal' had become confusion and apathy. In fact, the increased resolution of the government on foreign policy and its apparent distancing of itself from appeasement after Hitler's invasion of Czechoslovakia led to an increase in its popularity by April 1939. 86 The timing of events in Spain was also potentially important. The primary purpose of the Popular Front, argued Michael Foot, was to save 'Spain'. When Franco marched into Madrid in March 1939, 'there was no longer a Spain to save'. 87 The fall of the Spanish Republic must have dissipated some of the Petition campaign's impetus, though, for reasons discussed below, this effect was minimal.
Ultimately, the Cripps campaign failed for the underlying reasons that the United Peace Alliance had not gathered significant support in the region the previous year. A key consideration was loyalty. A national party statement, The Labour Party and the Popular Front, ended with the claim that the success of a political party depended on the loyalty and staying power of its members, and this had a strong resonance in the region. 88 The north-east labour movement was particularly noted for its loyalty, and it did not appear to falter in the late 1930s. In early May 1938, the Durham County Federation of Labour Parties (DCFLP) unanimously accepted the NEC's report that the Labour Party should not associate with political bodies that did not share its policy (i.e. Liberals and Communists in a Popular Front). 'However desirable, the expressed objects [of the Popular Front] can best be pursued within the ranks of our Party, as apart from the elementary principle of loyalty, the diffusion of effort and finance involved must inevitably weaken our organization', the DCFLP told its affiliates. 89 These considerations were paramount in informing the attitudes of regional labour movement leaders. 86 Eatwell, thesis, pp. 364-68. James Hinton argued that Chamberlain's apparent abandonment of appeasement in spring 1939 was 'a victory of sorts' for the Popular Front agitation as it had as much to do with fear of a Conservative rebellion as any genuine rethinking of foreign policy. J. Hinton The lack of official DMA support for Cripps's campaign and the earlier United Peace Alliance was crucial to their failures. In spring 1938, the union demonstrated its loyalty to Labour by overwhelmingly supporting an executive proposal to make a donation of £5,000 to the party (the lodge vote was 843:35 in favour). This was claimed to be the largest single contribution to the party by any one labour movement body. 90 Nothing occurred in 1938 or 1939 that shook the firm belief within the DMA that Labour alone was capable of righting the deteriorating situation. What was this loyalty based on? It is unlikely that it was based on fear. The NEC did not discipline north-east activists who openly supported the Popular Front in 1938, and only a handful of the main activists were expelled or threatened with such in 1939. If it was based on fear of the consequences of stepping out of line, then the fear was largely unfounded. As argued below, loyalty was also not based on satisfaction with the national leadership. Loyalty to Labour in the region was not blind and certainly did not accept everything the national leadership did or did not do. Rather, it appears to have been based on the belief that the labour movement was the best method of pursuing the interests of its members, regardless, and sometimes in spite of, the leadership.
The attitudes of important individuals in the regional labour movement suggest other reasons for the Popular Front's unpopularity. Some north-east Labour MPs seemed uninterested in foreign affairs. The awful economic problems of their constituents were a far greater concern. Others displayed complacency regarding the international situation. 91 However, these attitudes were not representative of the rankand-file, many of whom were active on Spain.
92 Notwithstanding this, the Popular Front remained fundamentally an expression of radical liberalism. This is significant in explaining its lack of support in the North-East. 93 Moreover, it proposed an alliance with Communists and Liberals, both of whom offended large sections of the north-east labour movement. In March 1938, for example, William Maclean (Wansbeck Labour parliamentary candidate) rejected 'new alliances to left or right' as they made for 'parliamentary weakness'. 94 This was despite Maclean's own constituency being a Conservative seat in this period. Alliances demanded compromise too. As one regional commentator wrote: Popular Front is the wrong name. UnPopular Front is truer. [. . .] Any party which stands for certain definite principles will find that many of those principles will have to be thrown overboard if it is necessary to curry favour with supporters from other parties'. Stewart said that 'during the crisis he came to the conclusion that there would never be a war. He had never budged from that opinion, but he thought the carving up of Czechoslovakia was cruel, wrong and unnecessary'. Hansard The regional labour movement was more ambivalent than openly hostile to Communists. North-East Labour leaders spent very little time condemning the doctrine and its practitioners. Instead, opposition to communism was manifest in the distinct lack of 'official' (i.e. non-Communist) regional labour movement support for all Communist ventures. The Communist Party remained relatively small and lacked influence in the region. Its logistical ability to advance its policies, such as the Popular Front, was consequently highly limited. 96 The party was unattractive to Labour for practical reasons too. It had very little electoral influence in the region and certainly not enough to win Labour a marginal seat. In fact, regional Labour leaders regarded Communist support as more of a vote loser. 97 However, there was no evidence that events in the Soviet Union, particularly the 'Show Trials', had any effect on attitudes within the 'official' north-east labour movement, as they had elsewhere. 98 Regarding the North-East District Communist Party, there is no evidence of opposition to the Popular Front policy. The regional party attempted to advocate and pursue the policy as much as its meagre resources would allow. There was equally no obvious disquiet from Communists in the region at the signing of the Hitler-Stalin non-aggression pact in August 1939.
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For the 'official' labour movement, a potential alliance with Liberals spawned a considerable number of additional reasons to oppose the Popular Front. These were emphasized by the national Labour leadership and strongly resonated in the North-East. Jupp has claimed that NEC attacks on non-socialists and the idea of class collaboration 'probably aroused more sympathy among the party membership [. . .]'. 100 In proposing the Popular Front the left 'broke with the tradition of the labour movement. According to this tradition independence from the other two major parties was the reason for the existence of the Labour Party'. 101 The Liberal Party was not the electoral force it once had been. The Liberal Party received its lowest ever vote in the 1935 general election. In 1936, Liberals only had 189 constituency associations and less than a third of these were active. 102 Because of the existence of local electoral pacts between Liberals and Conservatives, it is difficult to determine where Liberals were active in north-east local elections in the late 1930s. If the 1935 general election is an accurate reflection of Liberal strength in the region, then Liberals only had a significant presence in Barnard Castle and Bishop Auckland in the south of County Durham, and South Shields and Tynemouth on the Tyne. 103 Tactically, Labour was very unlikely to want an alliance with parties that were not as influential as they had been in the past (especially as Labour won three of these four north-east seats in 1935). 96 Although the regional Communist Party appeared broadly supportive of the Popular Front strategy, residual sectarianism within it also acted against the policy's advancement. 97 As Eatwell has noted, there was Labour support for the Popular Front in areas where the situation seemed hopeless for Labour, such as Cornwall. 104 This was not the case in the North-East. A Liberal stronghold before the First World War, the region was divided between supporters of the National Government and Labour after 1935. 105 Electoral expediency in the North-East meant that Popular Front supporters were always going to have problems convincing the labour movement in County Durham. As Ellen Wilkinson admitted in January 1939, the situation in County Durham was 'not so serious because of the strong position the party holds in that area'. 106 Of the fifteen County Durham seats covered in this article (Sunderland was a two-member constituency) Labour won twelve in 1935. 107 In Labour was far weaker in Northumberland, winning only one of nine seats in the county. Ostensibly, the practical electoral case for the Popular Front in Northumberland was far stronger. Yet only at Tynemouth was there a possibility that antigovernment forces could benefit from electoral unity. From 1922, Liberals and Labour secured a little less than a third of the vote each, allowing the Conservative victory on a minority vote. Again, though, it is not certain that the absence of a Liberal candidate would have induced Liberals to vote Labour. (If Liberal voters behaved like Liberal activists in the town, discussed below, then most of the Liberal vote would have gone to the Conservatives). Equally, it is not clear what Labour voters would have done if a Popular Front Liberal candidate had stood. Elsewhere in Northumberland, Labour fought only government candidates, winning Morpeth. In the seven straight fights that Labour lost to government candidates north of the Tyne, the presence of Liberal candidates, as at Barnard Castle, could well have helped them by taking votes from the Conservatives. Of course, Popular Front supporters could cite the national picture in arguing their case, or assert that the Popular Front was about creating a mass anti-government movement immediately, rather than a simple electoral pact at election time. Had the electoral situation in the North-East suggested more strongly that a Liberal-Labour pact would be advantageous, this could only have assisted Popular Front advocates. Yet, as with Labour electoral co-operation with Communists, if there was no ideological commitment to a pact, then even an extremely strong practical case would have had little or no effect.
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Regardless of these considerations, the situation for Labour in the North-East was evidently not hopeless. The Popular Front seemed defeatist, especially in a region where Labour was far from defeated. The anti-Popular Front DCFLP circular was upbeat when it appealed 'earnestly to our organizations to plan for victory [and] to extend their efforts'.
111 Like West Yorkshire, the North-East was an industrial area where Labour was dominant in many localities and wedded to the idea of remaining an independent force. 112 The fear that a Popular Front would actually stimulate a Liberal revival must also have characterized the attitudes of some regional labour movement leaders, who regarded Lib/Lab pacts as a discredited tactic.
As noted above, the fall of the Spanish Republic in March 1939 must have had some effect in disillusioning Petition campaign supporters in the labour movement. However, generally speaking, far from galvanizing greater support for the Popular Front, the urgent situation in Spain acted as a distraction from it. 113 The distraction of 'Spain' is vividly illustrated by the stark contrast between the level of labour movement support secured by Cripps's and the Tyneside foodship campaigns, which were running concurrently. Trevelyan and other left-wing Cripps supporters, such 110 Mates, thesis, pp. 182-83. 111 Durham Chronicle, 6 May 1938. 112 Murphy, thesis, pp. 382-87, 411, 440. 113 Of course, in some cases, this worked the other way round. For example, Trevelyan decided to donate £100 to Cripps's Petition campaign in Feb. 1939, instead of giving it, as he had previously intended, to support a plan for sending raw materials to Spain. Highly impressed by Cripps's plan, Trevelyan thought that 'to fundamentally alter the position here and really threaten our government would be a bigger help to Spain than anything'. However, Trevelyan represented a small minority of labour movement opinion. NRL, CPTEX133, C.P. Trevelyan letter to wife, 6 Feb. 1939; Mates, thesis, p. 184.
as Blenkinsop, also drew the erroneous conclusion that 'non-political', 'Aid Spain', campaigns illustrated a widespread desire for political co-operation against appeasement. 114 The experience of Cripps's abject failure to mobilize labour movement support in the North-East must have disabused them of this idea.
The effect of 'Spain' was not new. There had been an equally clear illustration of the distraction the conflict provided in 1938. Labour's change in national attitude from supporting the government's policy of non-intervention in Spain in 1936 to advocacy of the Republic's right to buy arms in 1937 had not placated many grassroots activists. Disquiet at the national leadership's inactivity on the issue and other foreign policy concerns was manifest in calls for an emergency national labour movement conference on Spain or the general international situation. By mid-1938, almost the entire north-east labour movement had expressed its desire for such a conference. (Owing to a change in the timing of the national Labour Party conference, none was scheduled for 1938). 116 This apparent desire to discuss the possibility of industrial direct action to place pressure on the government momentarily placed the regional movement far to the left of the constitution-obsessed national leadership.
However, the evident grassroots disaffection at the national leadership's refusal to organize a conference did not impel constituency Labour Parties in regions like the North-East into supporting the Popular Front. This almost complete inability to capitalize on discontent within the official labour movement rank-and-file suggests a further reason for the Popular Front's failure. Popular Fronters could not openly advocate mass industrial direct action for political ends for fear of scaring away potential support from Liberals and the middle class in general. Consequently, for a substantial part of the official labour movement rank-and-file, including much of the supposedly 'moderate' and 'loyal' North-East, the Popular Front policy was simply 'too Liberal' to have any appeal. This was especially problematic for the Communist Party. Its support for the Popular Front forced it to tone down previous policies and rhetoric at a time when open advocacy of industrial direct action could have had a 114 In retrospect, Trevelyan wasted his money on Cripps's campaign. However, by February 1939, little short of extensive British and French military intervention on the side of the Republic could have saved it. Foodships were too little and too late, and the number who saw them as aiding the Republic against fascism as opposed to simply providing succour to starving and innocent civilians is also unclear. Lewis significant resonance within the official labour movement, in the North-East and elsewhere. 117 Arguably, support for the Popular Front actually cost the Communist Party a degree of influence within the labour movement in the North-East.
In the North-East, interest in the Popular Front peaked in early summer 1938, at the same time as clamour from regional labour movement organizations for a national labour movement conference on Spain and the 'international situation' (though the latter was far more supported than the former). In the aftermath of Munich, support for a Popular Front in the North-East appeared less than in summer 1938. Even at its peak, this support was insignificant.
118 Thus, even if Cripps had launched his campaign at an earlier, more propitious moment, it is highly doubtful that he would have secured significantly more support in the North-East and elsewhere.
In attacking the Popular Front in March 1938, William Maclean mentioned another significant consideration. He argued that 'there can exist many approaches and many angles of vision' within the Labour Party, making it 'in the true sense, a Popular Front'. 119 Thus, one of the reasons that Labour did not need a Popular Front was because, in some senses, it already was one. As the Labour educationalist, R. H. Tawney, recognized in 1932, the Labour Party was clearly a cross-class alliance: 'If variety of educational experience and economic conditions among its active supporters be the tests, the Labour Party is, whether fortunately or not, as a mere matter of fact, less of a class party than any other British party.' 120 Generally speaking, Maclean's attitude appeared representative of the majority in the North-East. He approved of a diverse Labour Party and was implicitly critical of the NEC when he said 'unity is strength, but unity does not mean rigid regimentation and heresy hunting'. 121 There was very little witch hunting in the north-east against Popular Front supporters. Indeed, the region was a good deal more tolerant of its heretics than the national movement.
122 Yet, like the vast regional majority, Maclean did not support the Popular Front itself.
The very level of bickering and disputes within the regional movement in the period also testifies to its diversity. 123 Internal division was a further factor that worked against those seeking an alliance with outside forces. It was difficult enough ensuring some semblance of internal unity without the added complications of securing alliances with other parties. Roger Eatwell has argued that a Popular Front could have been mobilized around Labour's Immediate Programme. It was moderate and would not have alienated potential supporters from the right such as Liberals. This would also have precluded Labour objections that the movement was not socialist. 124 Yet it was surely simpler for Popular Front supporters to join the party that already advocated this programme, rather than attempt to engineer a cross-party alliance with all its attendant problems. 125 These 'Popular Fronters' could then have attempted to force the leadership to take a more active stand on its policies. As noted above, the leadership resisted calls for a national conference despite considerable pressure. Still, it was more likely to listen to its own members than to Liberals and others outside the party. The labour movement was already very broad in social and political terms. It could accommodate those who desired a stronger stand against the fascist powers and were able to accept its moderate domestic polices. Furthermore, it excluded Communists (at least theoretically if not necessarily in practice), which would have repelled many to the right of Labour.
The 'Capitalists': North-East Liberal and Conservative attitudes
Cripps's 1939 campaign aimed primarily at galvanizing support for the Popular Front inside the labour movement as most Popular Fronters agreed on the need for Labour Party leadership of the project. Still, Liberal support, especially, was required if the idea was to work. In theory, north-east Liberal support should have been forthcoming. The party's foreign policy was similar to Labour's and important national Liberal Party figures such as the party leader, Archibald Sinclair, and the MPs Wilfred Roberts, Geoffrey Mander and Sir Richard Acland supported the Popular Front since 1936. Vernon Bartlett, who won the Bridgwater by-election as an independent progressive in November 1938, was also a Liberal. Many significant north-east Liberals echoed their party's stance on foreign relations, calling for the establishment of a system of international 'collective security' that included Soviet Russia. 126 However, there was very little direct evidence of north-east Liberal involvement in the United Peace Alliance campaign. There were an indeterminate number of 'progressive organizations' outside the labour movement represented at a campaign conference in the region in May 1938, the same month as the Liberal Party nationally backed the strategy. However, the only organization that was definitely represented and probably contained Liberals (and which itself represented the Popular Front in microcosm) was the Left Book Club. None of the high profile regional politicians who endorsed this conference were Liberals. Only one north-east Liberal organization, Newcastle West Liberal Association, obviously supported the Liberal Party's renewed national endorsement of the Popular Front in the wake of Munich. Even then, there was no indication that Liberals in Newcastle West acted on the resolution by attempting to build links with Labour in the town. North-East Liberals were equally un-supportive of the Popular Front in 1939. The national Liberal organization told Liberal Associations that there would be no official participation in Cripps's campaign, but that individual Liberals could participate. In the North-East only one 'Liberal' figure appeared to have been involved. Enid Atkinson, a member of Lloyd George's grandly titled grouping, the 'Council of Action for Peace and Reconstruction', addressed a 'Petition Campaign' conference in Gateshead. 128 However, the minuscule 'Council of Action' was the only 'Liberal' body that obviously supported the Popular Front in the North-East, and it was not even strictly aligned with the Liberal Party. 129 Moreover, this support was not new in 1938. 'Council of Action' activists had been active with labour movement leftists in the north-east peace councils (Tyneside Joint Peace Council and Sunderland and District Peace Council) since 1936. 130 The only other direct evidence of Liberal support came in Bishop Auckland where another indeterminate number signed the Cripps Petition. 131 Of the significant north-east Liberals, Raymond Jones, parliamentary candidate for South Shields, went the closest to supporting the Popular Front in 1939. He told his constituency party annual meeting in February 1939 that 'It was high time there was a change of government in this country. The Labour Party was so engrossed in seeking a socialist state that it preferred to risk a continuance of the present government rather than join hands with any other party in defeating it'. 132 This was significant as, before 1939, Jones spent as much time attacking Labour as the government. 133 However, Jones did not mention the Popular Front at all in this speech in February 1939. Peculiarly, Jones' solution to the problem of the government's foreign policy and Labour's commitment to a socialist state was that one hundred Liberals were needed in Parliament as a 'safeguard'. 134 Not surprisingly, he played no part in the Cripps agitation. Other Liberals were more sympathetic towards the government. In April 1939, for example, M. R. Shankcross (secretary of the Northern Liberal Federation) said that Liberals would support the government 'so long as it continues with the policy of collective security'. While Shankcross argued that the present problematic situation was attributable to the government's foreign policy, he still thought that 'this was not the time for recriminations'. 135 The country was, he considered, now united 'left to right' behind the government.
THE NORTH-EAST AND THE POPULAR FRONT, 1938-39 Some north-east Liberals, such as Raymond Jones, were interested in foreign policy and critical of the government in broadly similar ways to Labour. Thus the Popular Front programme, based on radical Liberal foreign policy concerns and neglecting domestic policies where Liberal and Labour most diverged, must not have posed a problem in itself. However, there were practical reasons why an electoral alliance was problematic for Liberals. Roger Eatwell has claimed that many Liberals in the North opposed the Popular Front as they feared that an alliance would ultimately lead to the eclipse of the party. 136 This was the opposite of the argument used by Labour Party opponents of the Popular Front who feared that it might provoke a Liberal revival. Both arguments were plausible, depending on the workings of any putative electoral pact. Liberal fears of being eclipsed certainly could be justified in the NorthEast. In 1935, the only north-east Liberal MP lost to Labour in a straight fight at Bishop Auckland, and there were Liberal candidates in only three other north-east constituencies. Assuming that the Popular Front party with the best placed candidate in 1935 would automatically choose the candidate at a future general election, there would have been no Liberal candidates in the region. 137 However, Liberal Popular Front supporters could have argued that the party, without an alliance with Labour, would not win a seat in the region anyway. Moreover, it was possible that an electoral agreement would force Labour to stand down in a north-east constituency and allow the Liberal a free run. This scenario must have informed Labour fears of a Liberal revival. 138 Other aspects of the Popular Front that alienated Labour Party members applied equally to Liberals. Many did not wish to ally with Communists for the same reasons, and because Communists theoretically proposed to end capitalism. As with north-east labour movement attitudes, there was no evidence that the Moscow Show Trials worsened the image of the Communist Party in the eyes of Liberals. Communism was theoretical anathema to liberalism and that was sufficient.
Yet, for many north-east Liberals, socialism was little different. Tynemouth was particularly significant in this context. The local labour movement was weak there, while liberalism remained relatively strong. 139 As noted above, a roughly equal threeway split vote gave the Conservatives victory on a minority vote. Tynemouth Labour Party supported the Popular Front by 1939. At least one important local Liberal, Councillor Stanley Holmes, appeared sympathetic to co-operation with the left. 140 1936. In practice, the pact did not work well in Tynemouth. Both Liberals and Conservatives assumed the 'Moderate' label at municipal elections, but they still stood against other Moderates. 141 The parties made unsuccessful efforts to remedy this situation in 1936 and had a scare in December when a Communist, standing against no fewer than five Moderate candidates, was eighteen votes short of winning a byelection seat. 142 In February 1937, the president of Tynemouth Ratepayers' Association warned that 'unless the Moderate forces combine and show a united front, it will be inevitable that the Communist and Socialist forces will obtain command in this town also'. 143 Attempts to establish a firmer electoral understanding continued throughout spring 1937. However, eventually the Liberals refused to finalize arrangements with Conservatives owing to a 'bitter feeling' and divisions continued in the 1937 and 1938 municipal elections. 144 There remained a desire within Tynemouth Liberal circles for a degree of autonomy in an area where they remained relatively strong. Notwithstanding this, the situation in Tynemouth supported Hugh Dalton 147 This fundamental ideological underpinning was more important in determining attitudes than any similarity between Liberal and Labour foreign policies. Thus Eatwell's claim that Liberals could have been brought into a Popular Front based around Labour's Immediate Programme is very doubtful for north-east Liberals. Regardless of whether the programme was 'socialist', northeast Liberals were likely to have perceived it as such and therefore opposed it. This was Liberal 'loyalty': not to the party as such, but to Liberal principles. As these older established patterns of thinking and behaving appeared well entrenched in the North-East, it was consequently highly unlikely that there would have been any local electoral arrangements between anti-government parties in the region in the event of a general election. Eatwell noted that national Labour leaders could not cite Liberal opposition to the Popular Front as an argument against it. 148 However, the antisocialist attitude of most north-east Liberals provided regional Labour leaders with yet another argument against the Popular Front, should they have cared to use it.
There was another aspect of the more 'conservative' nature of north-east Liberalism. 149 The National Liberal Party in the region was much stronger than its 'independent' equivalent. In 1935, there were National Liberal candidates in five north-east constituencies. They were successful in Sunderland, Gateshead and Newcastle East and defeated in straight fights with Labour in Consett and Durham. Thus, the majority of north-east Liberals had chosen to stay with the National Government. Already involved in a parliamentary pact with Conservatives, these Liberals therefore would be very difficult, if not impossible, to attract to a pact with Labour (especially as none of them seemed to have any problems with Chamberlain's foreign policy; see below). As argued above, Liberal voters in the North-East appear to have been largely on the right of the Liberal political spectrum too. As general election results in Barnard Castle constituency showed, they tended to vote Conservative, rather than Labour in the absence of a Liberal candidate.
The only direct evidence of rank-and-file Conservative/National Liberal support for the Popular Front in the North-East was the indeterminate number of National Government supporters who apparently signed the Cripps Petition at Bishop Auckland. 150 Dissent at government foreign policy was a necessary starting point for to Spain'. 155 If Headlam's attitude was, as Nigel Crowson claimed, representative of mainstream Conservative opinion, then the Popular Front was never going to attract a significant number of dissident Conservatives. 156 A handful of north-east Conservatives were involved in the Tyneside foodship campaign, but this was of no consequence for the Popular Front project.
157

Conclusion
The experience of the Petition Campaign in the North-East largely reflected the national picture. It failed to secure significant support from any section of the labour movement in an important region. Extensive support for Cripps in a moderate dominated Labour region such as the North-East would have suggested that his campaign could have been more successful. This support simply did not materialize. The majority of labour movement moderates in the region permitted the left and their few supporters to conduct their Popular Front campaigns and then comprehensively defeated them in votes on the issue in every constituency Labour Party except one. Strong disquiet at the national leadership's stance, particularly its lack of action on Spain, did not translate into substantial support for the Popular Front. A handful of northeast Labour politicians may have briefly supported a Popular Front at the time of Munich, but if they did their support was very short-lived. 158 It was clear that, apart from the small Communist influenced Labour left, most in the North-East saw their labour movement as sufficient in itself to rectify the situation, if only the leadership would take a firmer lead and discuss tactics with the membership. Even the leadership's refusal to do this did not spawn great support for the Popular Front. Alliances to the left and right brought more problems than they solved, and there was plenty of room for any Popular Front supporter within the Labour Party. Indeed, the Labour Party was already a kind of 'Popular Front', and infinitely preferable to an alliance with a declining political force (liberalism) that could not be trusted to deliver its supporters' votes. The United Peace Alliance failed in the region for these reasons in 1938. Cripps's campaign came at a less propitious time and, despite his energy and resources, Cripps failed even to muster the numbers that had been mobilized in the previous year. This failure was not due to Cripps's personality, the niceties of his programme, or his ill-conceived tactics. The North-East retained its traditional loyalty to the Labour leadership and remained convinced that salvation lay in the electoral victory of a diverse, un-regimented and independent labour movement. 159 The 159 In general, the north-east labour movement tolerated its rebels. Trevelyan was the only figure of national standing to be expelled in the region for supporting Cripps. Only Bishop Auckland constituency Labour Party expelled local activists. This was Hugh Dalton's seat, a key opponent of Cripps on the NEC. Lesser ranking politicians such as Wilkes and Blenkinsop were allowed their rebellion without suffering serious consequences. It is debatable whether they would have been expelled had their profile been higher. Lawther and Watson were permitted to continue supporting Cripps without reprimand from DMA council. Like the United Peace Alliance the year before resolutions on the topic were not allowed to appear at DMA council meetings, thereby minimizing division. The same tolerance also ensured that divisions within the regional movement over Catholic attitudes to Labour policies on the Spanish Civil War were minimized. Mates, thesis, pp. 79-108, 117-18.
regional labour movement, an influential component of the national movement, was simply not interested in the Popular Front. Vehemently opposed to both communism and socialism, and prepared to ally either permanently at parliamentary level or simply at local electoral level with fellow capitalists, it is hardly surprising that the very small 'independent' Liberal forces in the North-East did not provide any noticeable support for the Popular Front. The Liberal Party leader, Archibald Sinclair, feared that a Popular Front alliance with Labour would mean the loss of many members on the right of the party. A Popular Front agreement at national level would surely have completely ended the small independent Liberal presence in the region. North-east Conservatives largely supported their government's foreign policy or rebelled at only aspects of it. This rebellion never led them into firm contact with Popular Fronters on the left. Figures like Headlam showed that considerable disquiet could exist amongst government supporters at its foreign policy, but that the perceived origins of present difficulties in no way led inevitably to an anti-government alliance. In spite of his wealth and undoubted oratorical ability, Cripps was never likely to convince a significant section of the north-east labour movement of the need for a Popular Front. Even if he had, there would have been very few to the right of Labour keen to join forces in the region.
